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Abstract
Purpose:  This  paper  empirically  investigates  the  factors  that  impact  voluntary
information  disclosure  level  of  Turkish  manufacturing  companies  listed in  the Borsa
Istanbul (BIST).
Design/methodology/approach: The data  collection  methodology of  the study is
content analysis of annual reports of the corporations listed on the BIST for the year
2010. In order to analyze the results, we employed Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and
Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) regressions to examine the association between the
explanatory variables and voluntary disclosure level.
Findings: The findings provide evidence of a positive association between voluntary
information disclosure level  and  the variables such  as  firm size,  auditing  firm size,
proportion of independent directors on the board, institutional/corporate ownership, and
corporate governance. However, leverage and ownership diffusion were found to have
negative significant association with the extent of voluntary disclosure. The remaining
variables,  namely,  profitability,  listing  age,  and  board  size  were  found  to  be
insignificant.
Research  limitations/implications:  The  study  has  got  some  implications  for
emerging markets particularly. Voluntary disclosure contributes to alleviate the agency
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costs  arising  from  information  asymmetry,  makes  the  firms  more  transparent  and
accountable,  and opens the way for  capital  flow emerging markets  need to finance
growth. Therefore, the subject is quite important for emerging markets. The study has
some implications for firms, auditors, investors, and regulators. All these parties play an
important role in improving the transparency and disclosure practices of corporations.
Since this study was conducted solely on listed manufacturing companies, the results
may not be generalizable to non-listed and non-manufacturing industries.
Originality/value: We  extend previous  research  on the  determinants  of  voluntary
information disclosure in the emerging market context.
Keywords: Corporate reporting, Firm characteristics, Voluntary disclosure, Annual reports, 
Turkey
Jel Codes: G34, M40, M41
Introduction
Business organizations have become aware of the importance of presenting information about
the broader range of activities including both their financial  performance and non-financial
performance such as socially responsible performance (Akisik & Gal, 2011). After corporate
scandals and financial crises, regulators, academicians, investors and other stakeholders called
for greater corporate transparency from the business world. Greater corporate transparency
means  decreasing  information  asymmetry  between  managers  and  stakeholders  by  better
information  disclosure  via  various  media  such  as  press  releases,  corporate  web  sites,
prospectuses, and annual reports. 
In the relevant literature, information disclosure is categorized as mandatory disclosure and
voluntary  disclosure.  Mandatory  disclosure  primarily  focuses  on  presentation  of  financial
statements and their complementary footnotes which are required by regulations and laws,
whereas voluntary disclosure allows the management the freedom to choose which information
to disclose (Uyar & Kılıç, 2012a). 
One of the main rights of investors is to get informed by the companies they invest. Because,
they are outside the business and they make decision regarding their investments depending
on the information disclosed in corporate reports. Thus, providing sufficient information for
investors  on  corporate  reports  is  quite  important.  In  recent  years,  corporate  reports  are
expanding their  scope by covering non-financial  activities  of  the firms along with financial
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results. As a result of comprehensive public disclosure, investors and other stakeholders are
becoming more aware of companies’ financial results and also non-financial aspects such as
social  responsibility,  environment,  employees,  customers,  and  so  on.  Doing  so,  firms  will
reduce the asymmetric information problem between stakeholders and the managers, reduce
agency costs, and legitimize their activities. Moreover, Singhvi and Desai (1971) indicated that
inadequate disclosures in annual reports are likely to cause fluctuations in the share prices
since investment decisions are based on less objective measures in the absence of sufficient
information. Furthermore, firms which have low level of transparency might have difficulty in
finding  capital  to  finance  its  operations  or  they  might  incur  higher  cost  of  capital  (more
information Elliott & Jacobson, 1994).  
Turkey is  of  great interest  due to  the following reasons.  The Turkish economy has shown
remarkable performance in recent years and has been one of the fastest growing economies in
the  world.  Major  structural  reforms,  hastened  by  Turkey’s  EU  (European  Union)  accession
process  and fiscal  policies  have integrated the Turkish economy into  the globalized world.
Furthermore, regulations regarding capital  markets and harmonization efforts in accounting
have  taken  place  in  the  country.  Accounting  standards  which  are  fully  harmonized  with
IAS/IFRS  (International  Accounting  Standards/International  Financial  Reporting  Standards)
have been published by Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency for financial institutions,
and by the Capital Markets Board for the publicly traded companies have been implemented
since 2005 (Alp & Ustundag, 2009). In late 2010, TFRS (Turkish Financial Reporting Standards)
compatible  with  IFRS for SMEs (International  Financial  Reporting Standards  for  Small  and
Medium-Sized Enterprises) were enacted. In early 2011, new Turkish Commercial Code was
promulgated.  In order to promote transparency,  Corporate  Governance Principles  (CGP)  of
Turkey was issued by the Capital  Markets  Board,  which is  the regulatory and supervisory
authority in charge of the securities markets in Turkey, in June 2003 for the first time and
amended in February 2005 (CMB, 2005).
This  study  investigates  the  determinants  of  voluntary  disclosure  in  an  emerging  market
context, namely Turkey. Emerging capital markets break from those of developed countries in
several  aspects:  they have high growth potential,  relatively  weak regulatory  environment,
weak  corporate  governance  leading  to  expropriation  of  minority  shareholders,  and  low
information disclosure levels causing a high information gap between managers and investors
(Uyar & Kiliç, 2012b). Thus, this study aims at attracting the attention of regulatory bodies and
firms to improve the weak transparency in emerging markets. The findings of the study have
implications  for  firms,  regulatory  bodies,  and  emerging  markets.  Understanding  the
determinants of voluntary disclosure is important since regulators can use this information to
promote  corporate  transparency.  In  addition,  managers  may  realize  the  importance  of
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information disclosure and learn the determinants of better disclosure practices. This will result
in  better  provision of  information to  stakeholders.  Thus,  investors  will  make more healthy
decisions regarding their investing activities. 
The remainder  of  the paper  is  organized as  follows:  Section  2 provides  literature  review.
Section  3 develops  the hypotheses.  In  Section  4,  the research methodology is  explained.
Section  5  analyzes  the  results.  Finally,  Section  6  and  7  concludes  the  paper,  explains
limitations and makes recommendations for further research.
Literature review
Many  researchers  cite  the  work  of  Cerf  (1961)  as  the  starting  point  of  empirical  studies
regarding disclosure level in annual reports. Since then, the topic has attracted great attention
of academicians from both developed and developing countries. Earlier empirical studies were
mostly conducted in developed countries, and then developing or less developed countries
started to follow them. Moreover, in prior studies, the number of variables and the number of
items in the disclosure list were lesser than those of current studies. One of the earlier studies
conducted in the US by Singhvi and Desai (1971) based on a 34-item disclosure checklist, and
they found that listing status of the firms affect disclosure quality. Another study carried out in
Sweden  proved  the  same  significant  association  between  quotation  status  and  voluntary
disclosure  (Cooke,  1989).  Later  on,  Forker  (1992)  conducted  a  study  on  the  UK  quoted
companies, and he found a weak support for the association between internal monitoring and
share option disclosure quality. In the last decade, a sizeable number of disclosure studies also
conducted in other countries such as China (Cheung, Jiang & Tan, 2010), Singapore (Cheng &
Courtenay, 2006), Turkey (Aksu  & Kosedag,  2006), Hong Kong (Gul  & Leung, 2004), Ghana
(Bokpin  & Isshaq, 2009), Malaysia (Haniffa  & Cooke, 2002; Haat, Rahman & Mahenthiran,
2008), Qatar (Naser, Al-Hussaini, Al-Kwari & Nuseibeh, 2006), Saudi Arabia (Alsaeed, 2006).
While earlier studies mostly evaluated the association between certain firm characteristics such
as firm size, profitability, leverage, auditor size and voluntary disclosure level, recent studies
have  investigated  the  association  between  corporate  governance  attributes  and  ownership
structure along with the variables in earlier studies and voluntary disclosure level. Ahmed and
Courtis (1999) conducted meta-analysis based on 29 disclosure studies between 1968 and
1997 by using variables such as corporate size, listing status, leverage, profitability, and audit
firm size. They confirmed significant and positive relationships between disclosure levels and
corporate size, listing status, and leverage, but they found no significant association between
disclosure levels and profitability, and audit firm size.
While there are many overall voluntary disclosure studies published previously, there are also
specific  disclosure  studies  focusing  on subjects  such  as  environmental  disclosures,  human
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resource  disclosures,  forward-looking  information  disclosures,  graphical  disclosures,  and
financial ratio disclosures. Providing voluntary disclosure and behaving in a socially responsible
manner pays in such a way that communicating (reporting) firms have statistically significant
higher market valuation, higher return on assets and return on equity, lower cost of debt,
lower cost of equity, and lower beta indicating better performance and less risk (Kimbro & Cao,
2011). 
Previously,  Aksu  and  Kosedag  (2006)  have  conducted  a  study  in  Turkey  regarding  the
determinants  of  voluntary  disclosure  level.  They  evaluated  transparency  and  disclosure
practices  of  52  largest  and  most  liquid  companies  listed  on  the  Istanbul  Stock  Exchange
(currently, the official name of the stock exchange in Turkey is Borsa Istanbul (BIST), it was
named as Istanbul Stock Exchange previously) by analyzing 2003 annual reports and web
sites. They used five independent variables, namely, free cash flow, accounting performance
(return  on  equity),  leverage,  size  (market  capitalization),  and  market-to-book  ratio.  They
found size and market-to-book ratio are significant in explaining variations in transparency and
disclosure score. 
Several theories have been used by earlier researchers to explain why firms are engaged in
disclosing information voluntarily. The most frequently used ones are agency theory, signalling
theory, legitimacy theory, and stakeholder theory (Cooke, 1989; Freedman & Jaggi,  2005;
Healy & Palepu, 2001; Hossain, Perera & Abdul Rahman, 1995; Marston, 2003; Marston &
Polei, 2004; Naser et al., 2006; Oyelere, Laswad & Fisher, 2003; Watson, Shrives & Marston,
2002).
Agency theory expresses the relationship between the managers and shareholders of a firm
and explains why managers try to maximize their own benefit  (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
Agency costs are incurred resulting from the conflict of interests and information asymmetry
between owners and managers. Thus, managers are expected to disclose more information to
reduce agency costs (Hossain et al., 1995; Watson et al., 2002; Marston, 2003; Oyelere et al.,
2003; Marston & Polei, 2004; Barako, Hancock & Izan, 2006; Hassan, Giorgioni, Romilly &
Power, 2009). 
Another theory that explains voluntary information disclosure practices is  signalling theory.
This theory suggests that managers need to disclose more information to lower information
asymmetry  between  investors  and  themselves.  The  users  of  financial  reporting  need
confidence of financial markets; information disclosure will increase this confidence (Hossain &
Hammami,  2009).  Thus,  the investors  will  feel  safer  with the increased level  of  voluntary
information disclosure.
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According to legitimacy theory, the firm tries to justify its existence in society by legitimizing
its activities (Naser et al., 2006). Firms should behave in accordance with perceived goals of
the society to alleviate the public pressures and to legitimize their activities (Lindblom, 1994;
Freedman & Jaggi, 2005; Sobhani,  Amran & Zainuddin, 2009; Belal & Cooper, 2011). One
important way for firms to legitimize their activities is to disclose information to the public.
Hence, they need more information disclosure.
Finally,  stakeholder  theory  can be used to  explain  why firms tend to  disclose  information
voluntarily.  Stakeholders are the parties  that  have interest  in the firm, and therefore, are
interested  in  firms’  activities.  Stakeholders  include  the  managers,  stockholders,  creditors,
customers, suppliers, government, trade unions, and the general public (Uyar & Kılıç, 2012a).
In order to gain the support of stakeholders, the companies should communicate with their
stakeholders  (Smith, Adhikari  & Tondkar,  2005). Thus,  the stakeholders’  demand for more
information motivates companies to disclose information voluntarily.
Despite the motivations and advantages of disclosing voluntary information, however, some
firms refrain themselves from disclosing information due to  the following reasons:  cost  of
gathering, processing, and publishing information; fear of damaging the competitive position of
the firm (Healy & Palepu, 2001), and not preferring to disclose unfavourable news to avoid the
costs associated with disclosure (Beyer, Cohen, Lys & Walther, 2010).
Hypotheses development
Institutional/Corporate ownership
Although, institutions are considered one of the types of block holder ownership (Eng & Mak,
2003), there is not sufficient empirical evidence in relation to association between institutional
ownership and voluntary disclosure level. Two studies found no significant association between
these two variables (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Eng & Mak, 2003). However, Healy, Hutton and
Palepu (1999) argued that one of the potential benefits of expanded disclosures is increasing
institutional analyst interest. Their findings from both univariate test and multivariate analysis
were consistent with their hypotheses that expanded disclosure is associated with increased
growth in institutional ownership (Healy et al., 1999). Bushee and Noe (2000) also provided
evidence  on  the  impact  of  corporate  disclosure  practices  on  the  composition  of  a  firm's
institutional  investor  base.  El-Gazzar  (1998) argues that  large institutional  ownership  may
induce a higher voluntary disclosure level. Thus, the following hypothesis is formulated:
• H1.  There  is  a  positive  association  between  proportion  of  shares  held  by
institutional/corporate investors and the level of voluntary disclosure. 
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Ownership diffusion/dispersion
Diffuse ownership is  beneficial  in  terms of  an optimal  allocation  of  risk bearing,  but as  a
consequence, the firm's shareholders are generally too diversified to take much direct interest
in a particular firm (Fama, 1980). Hence, there is an increased need for monitoring in firms
whose  ownership  is  diffused  (Eng  &  Mak,  2003).  Prior  studies  have  investigated  the
relationship between ownership structure and voluntary disclosure practices of the corporations
(Singhvi & Desai, 1971; Malone, Fries & Jones, 1993; Raffournier, 1995; Patelli & Prencipe,
2007; Aripin, Tower & Taylor, 2009). Malone et al. (1993) point out that as the number of
shareholders  increases,  financial  disclosures  are  expected  to  increase.  Singhvi  and  Desai
(1971) state that there may be a positive association between the number of stockholders and
the quality of disclosure in annual reports. Moreover, Raffournier (1995) argues that agency
relations may play a major role in the disclosure policy of companies because annual reports
can be used to reduce monitoring costs. Hence, he believes that managers of firms with diffuse
ownership  are  motivated  to  disclose  more  information  to  help  shareholders  monitor  their
behaviour. However, Raffournier (1995) and Alsaeed (2006) found no significant association
between ownership diffusion and the level of voluntary disclosure, whereas Patelli and Prencipe
(2007) found positive significant relationship. Thus, the following is hypothesized:
• H2. There is a positive association between a firm’s ownership diffusion and the level of
voluntary disclosure.
In this study, ownership diffusion is defined as the percentage of shares not held by known
shareholders (Raffournier, 1995).
Independent directors
One of the variables increasingly used in recent disclosure studies is the ratio of independent
directors on the board. Inclusion of outside directors on the board might enhance the viability
of the board as an internal control mechanism (Fama, 1980), prevent expropriation of security
holder wealth (Fama, 1980), attenuate agency costs (Forker, 1992) and create pressure for
better disclosure (Forker, 1992). Generally, the terms, ‘independent non-executive directors’
(Chen & Jaggi, 2000; Ho & Wong, 2001; Chau & Gray, 2010), ‘independent directors’ (Cheng &
Courtenay, 2006), ‘non-executive directors’ (Forker, 1992; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Hossain &
Reaz, 2007) and ‘outside directors’ (Eng & Mak, 2003) are interchangeably used to define this
variable.  If  independent  directors  on  the  board  actually  conduct  their  controlling  and
monitoring role,  good corporate governance is strengthened (Chau & Gray, 2010),  boards’
effectiveness  is  enhanced (Haniffa  & Cooke,  2002),  disclosure quality  is  improved (Forker,
1992) and more information disclosure is expected (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Eng & Mak, 2003).
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The  results  of  previous  studies  are  not  consistent  in  relation  to  the  association  between
proportion of independent directors on the board and the level of voluntary disclosure. Some
studies found positive significant association between the two variables (Cheng & Courtenay,
2006; Huafang & Jianguo, 2007; Patelli & Prencipe, 2007; Chau & Gray, 2010), two studies
found negative association (Eng & Mak, 2003; Gul & Leung, 2004) and some others found no
significant association (Forker, 1992; Ho & Wong, 2001; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Hossain &
Reaz, 2007). Thus, the following is hypothesized:
• H3. There is a positive association between proportion of independent directors on the
board and the level of voluntary disclosure.
Board size
John and Senbet (1998) state that while the board's monitoring capacity increases parallel to
board size, the benefits may be outweighed by the incremental cost of poorer communication
and decision-making associated with larger groups. Thus, limiting the size of the board may
improve efficiency. Although Samaha, Dahawy, Abdel-Meguid and Abdallah (2012) found that
companies with larger boards have greater corporate internet reporting comprehensiveness,
Cheng and Courtenay (2006) state that there is no theory or empirical evidence to suggest an
association between board size and voluntary disclosure level, they tested their hypothesis and
found no significant association.  Thus,  we develop the hypothesis  based on the finding of
Samaha et al. (2012) as follows:
• H4.  There  is  a  positive  association  between  board  size  and  the  level  of  voluntary
disclosure.
Corporate governance index (XCORP) of the Borsa Istanbul (BIST)
Aksu and Kosedag (2006) state that  expected benefits of good corporate governance, and
transparency  and  disclosure  practices  are  especially  important  for  emerging  markets  like
Turkey which grow faster  than developed countries,  and therefore,  needs external  capital.
Bokpin and Isshaq (2009) views high information disclosure level as the symptom of quality
corporate  governance  practices.  In  order  to  ensure  investor  protection  and  to  promote
transparency,  Corporate  Governance Principles  of  Turkey  (CGP)  was  issued  by the Capital
Markets Board in June 2003 for the first time and amended in February 2005 (CMB, 2005). The
XCORP  of  the  BIST  is  established  to  measure  the  price  and  return  performances  of  the
companies  traded  on  the  BIST  markets,  determining  corporate  governance  rating  grades
according to the CGP issued by the Capital Markets Board (BIST, 2009). The companies listed
in this index implement the best practices of corporate governance principles including public
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disclosure  and  transparency.  Previously,  Uyar  (2012)  investigated  the  association  between
listing in the XCORP and disclosure level on the corporate web sites, and found significant
positive association between the two variables. Hence, the following hypothesis is formulated:
• H5. There is a positive association between listing in the XCORP of the BIST and the
level of voluntary disclosure.
Listing age
Owusu-Ansah (1998: page 614) explains why the extent of a company’s information disclosure
may be influenced by its age. He mentions three factors in this regard: younger companies
may suffer  competitive  disadvantage;  gathering,  processing  and  disseminating  information
may be more costly and onerous for younger firms; younger companies may lack a ‘track
record’ on which they can rely for public disclosure. Several previous studies used firm age
variable. While, Hossain and Hammami (2009) found positive significant association between
firm  age  and  disclosure  level,  Alsaeed  (2006)  and  Hossain  and  Reaz  (2007)  found  no
significant association.
Moreover, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) utilized listing age in their study. Listing age has not been
tested at all in earlier studies, and therefore, there is not much empirical evidence pertaining
to this variable. This approach has been adopted in this study as well. Listing age is the length
of time a company has been listed on a capital market, and it may be relevant in explaining
the voluntary disclosure level (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). Haniffa and Cooke (2002) investigated
the  association  between  listing  age  and  the  extent  of  voluntary  disclosure,  and  found  no
significant association between the two variables. Thus,  the following hypothesis  has been
developed:
• H6.  There  is  a  positive  association  between  listing  age  and  the  level  of  voluntary
disclosure.
Firm size
Inchausti (1997) argued that information disclosures may be used to decrease agency costs, to
reduce information asymmetries between the company and the providers of  funds, and to
reduce political costs. The reasons for large firms’ tendency to disclose more information are
explained  by  Singhvi  and  Desai  (1971)  as  follows:   accumulation  and  disclosure  cost  of
information is not high compared to smaller firms; management of larger corporations is likely
to realize the possible benefits of information disclosure, such as greater marketability and
greater ease of financing; smaller corporations may feel that full information disclosure may
endanger their competitive position. In addition, since larger firms are more exposed to public
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scrutiny than smaller firms, they are inclined to disclose more information (Alsaeed, 2006).
Large firms are likely to be more complex and complexity requires more disclosure (Cooke,
1989). Many previous studies have supported a positive association between firm size and
voluntary disclosure level (Wallace, Naser & Mora, 1994; Inchausti, 1997; Eng & Mak, 2003;
Aksu & Kosedag, 2006; Alsaeed,  2006; Hossain & Reaz,  2007; Huafang & Jianguo, 2007;
Hossain & Hammami, 2009;Uyar, 2009; Chau & Gray, 2010). Thus, the hypothesis has been
developed as:
• H7.  There  is  a  positive  association  between  firm  size  and  the  level  of  voluntary
disclosure.
Profitability
Agency theory suggests that managers of profitable firms tend to disclose more information to
support the continuance of their positions and compensation arrangements (Inchausti, 1997).
Signalling theory implies that when company performance is good, companies will be more
inclined to signal their quality to investors (Inchausti, 1997; Watson et al., 2002). Political
process theory argues that firms disclose more information in order to justify the level of
profits (Inchausti, 1997). In addition, management of a profitable firm may wish to disclose
more information to the public to promote a positive impression (Alsaeed, 2006). The empirical
evidence, however, is mixed. Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Gul and Leung (2004) and Cheng and
Courtenay (2006) found positive significant association, whereas Ho and Wong (2001), Alsaeed
(2006), Hossain and Hammami (2009), Wallace et al. (1994), Inchausti (1997), and Chau and
Gray (2010) found no significant association. In view of these findings, the hypothesis has
been developed as:
• H8.  There  is  a  positive  association  between  profitability  and  the level  of  voluntary
disclosure.
Leverage
Leverage describes a company’s financial structure, and measures the long term risk implied
by that structure (Watson et al., 2002). Previous studies have largely used agency theory to
explain  the relationship  between  leverage  and  corporate  disclosure  (Hossain  et  al.,  1995;
Inchausti,  1997; Watson et al.,  2002; Alsaeed,  2006; Abdullah & Ku Ismail,  2008). Firms
which have higher debt in their capital structure are prone to higher agency cost (Alsaeed,
2006). Information disclosure may be used to avoid agency costs and to reduce information
asymmetries (Inchausti, 1997). Hence, it is argued that leveraged firms have to disclose more
information to satisfy information needs of the creditors (Uyar & Kılıç, 2012a). Many of the
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previous studies proved no significant association between leverage and the level of voluntary
disclosure (Wallace et al., 1994; Inchausti, 1997; Ho & Wong, 2001; Aksu & Kosedag, 2006;
Alsaeed, 2006; Huafang & Jianguo, 2007; Chau & Gray, 2010), while some found a positive
significant association (Malone et al., 1993; Hossain et al., 1995). In contrast, surprisingly, Eng
and Mak (2003) found a negative significant association. Hence, the following hypothesis was
formulated:
• H9.  There  is  a  positive  association  between  leverage  and  the  level  of  voluntary
disclosure.
Auditor size
The size of the audit firm has been related to the voluntary disclosure level in many previous
studies. Many of them hypothesized that there is a positive association between audit firm size
and disclosure level. The justification for positive association is that Big-4 audit firms have
greater experience since they are international firms, and they do not just audit annual reports
and accounts,  but also  influence them (Wallace et  al.,  1994). Auditing firms may use the
information disclosed by their clients as a means of signalling their own quality (Inchausti,
1997). Furthermore, they are more concerned with their reputation and, therefore, require
higher disclosure from their clients (Alsaeed, 2006). Hence, clients of Big-4 audit firms are
expected to disclose higher levels of information.  Although some studies found significant
positive  association  between  auditor  size  and  the level  of  voluntary  disclosure  (Singhvi  &
Desai, 1971; Inchausti, 1997; Patton & Zelenka, 1997; Uyar, 2011), others found insignificant
association (Wallace et al.,  1994; Alsaeed, 2006; Huafang & Jianguo, 2007; Chau & Gray,
2010). Thus, the hypothesis has been developed:
• H10: There is a positive association between auditor size and the level of voluntary
disclosure.
Research methodology
Data
The sample of the study consists of manufacturing companies listed on the BIST at the end of
the year 2010. Initial sample included 138 manufacturing companies. We downloaded annual
reports of corporations for the year 2010 from corporate web sites. However, annual reports of
some firms were unavailable on corporate web sites. We requested annual reports of those
companies by the e-mail. Most of them have replied positively and provided us with annual
reports. Hence, final sample includes 131 corporations. We hand-collected data regarding 96
voluntary disclosure items (see Appendix A) and other variables used in the analysis. 
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Voluntary disclosure index
Previous studies have mostly utilized disclosure check lists to collect voluntary disclosure data.
Hossain and Hammami (2009) state that selection of voluntary disclosure items is a subjective
judgment depending on the nature and context of the industry and country context. However,
the  consistency  in  many  disclosure  items  can  be  realized  across  previous  studies  when
checklists examined. The checklist of this study was constructed by examining a wide range of
recent studies from various countries (Cormier & Gordon, 2001; Watson et al., 2002; Aksu &
Kosedag, 2006; Alsaeed, 2006; Boesso & Kumar, 2007; Hossain & Reaz, 2007; Huafang &
Jianguo, 2007; Lim, Matolcsy & Chow, 2007; Tsamenyi,  Enninful-Adu & Onumah, 2007; Haat
et al., 2008; Eng & Mak, 2003; Hossain & Hammami, 2009; Chau & Gray, 2010; Cheung et al.,
2010; Depoers & Jeanjean, 2010; Lopes & Alencar, 2010; Mun, Courtenay & Rahman, 2011).
The  96-item  check  list  is  categorized  under  12  subtitles,  namely,  general  information,
corporate  strategy,  corporate  governance,  financial  performance,  key  non-financial
information,  forward-looking  information,  employee  disclosure,  social  responsibility,
environmental disclosure, segment reporting, risk management, and customer and supplier
disclosure. The checklist is reported in Appendix A.
To  determine  the  disclosure  level  of  voluntary  items,  earlier  studies  have  utilized  two
approaches:  weighted  (Botosan,  1997;  Ho  &  Wong,  2001;  Patelli  &  Prencipe,  2007)  or
unweighted index (Cooke,  1989;  Meek, Gray & Roberts,  1995;  Alsaeed,  2006; Huafang &
Jianguo, 2007; Hossain & Hammami, 2009; Chau & Gray, 2010). The utilization of a weighted
disclosure index has been criticised since it may introduce a bias towards a particular user-
orientation (Barako et al., 2006), and is based on a subjective importance rating ranked by the
researchers (Alsaeed, 2006). Therefore, we adopted unweighted index in this research.  In
unweighted index,  each item of disclosure is  considered equally  important (Cooke,  1989).
Coding procedure was carried out with one co-author of the paper, but questionable disclosure
items were discussed during the coding process by co-authors. Coding done by one author
provides stability (the extent to which the same coder is consistent over time when coding the
same content) which is considered as one of the reliability types (Krippendorff, 1980 in Beattie,
McInnes & Fearnley, 2004).  Disclosure level  of  a  company was calculated by dichotomous
procedure which assigns a score of one if a corporation discloses an item and a score of zero if
it does not (Cooke, 1989; Huafang & Jianguo, 2007; Hossain & Hammami, 2009). Accordingly,
the voluntary disclosure index (VDINDEX) for each company was calculated as follows (Cooke,
1989; Hossain & Reaz, 2007; Hossain & Hammami, 2009):
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∑
=
=
1j n
djVDINDEX
where:
dj=1 if the item j is disclosed
0 if the item j is not disclosed
n=number of items
We have used 



−
=
VDINDEX
VDINDEXLogDSCORE
1 as the dependent variable in the models. 
Model development
We employed Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) regressions
to examine the association between the explanatory variables and voluntary disclosure level.
Since there are multicollinearity problem between SALES and ASSETS, FFLOAT and INSOWN,
as explained in the analysis and results section, these pairs of variables are not included in the
models at the same time. Hence, the following models are established:
DSCORE=β0 + β1 SALES + β2 ROE + β3 LEVER + β4 AUDITOR + β5 FFLOAT + β6 BSIZE
+ β7INDIR+ β8 LAGE + β9 XCORP + ε
(1)
DSCORE=β0 + β1 SALES + β2 ROE + β3 LEVER + β4 AUDITOR + β5 INSOWN + β6 BSIZE
+ β7INDIR+ β8 LAGE + β9 XCORP + ε
(2)
DSCORE=β0 + β1 ASSETS + β2 ROE + β3 LEVER + β4 AUDITOR + β5 FFLOAT + β6 BSIZE
+ β7INDIR+ β8 LAGE + β9 XCORP + ε
(3)
DSCORE=β0  + β1  ASSETS +  β2  ROE +  β3 LEVER +  β4 AUDITOR +  β5 INSOWN +
β6 BSIZE + β7INDIR+ β8 LAGE + β9 XCORP + ε
(4)
where:



−
=
VDINDEX
VDINDEXLogDSCORE
1 such that VDINDEX is the ratio of total items disclosed
to maximum score for firm;
SALES=total sales revenues;
ASSETS=total assets;
ROE=return on equity;
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LEVER=leverage as measured by total liabilities divided by total assets;
AUDITOR=dummy variable for audit firm size, coded as 1 for Big-4 and 0 otherwise;
FFLOAT=Free float rate (i.e. percentage of shares held by unknown shareholders);
INSOWN=Institutional/corporate ownership (i.e. shares held by institutions and other
corporations);
BSIZE=number of board members;
INDIR=proportion of independent directors on the board;
LAGE=listing age; and
XCORP= Listing in Corporate Governance Index of BIST, coded 1 for listing, 0 otherwise.
In  the  regression  models  above,  SALES,  INSOWN,  and  FFLOAT  variables  are  potentially
endogenous.  Endogeneity  is  that  there  is  a  two  way  relationship  between  the  dependent
variable and some of the explanatory variables. In such a case, unlike the single equation
models the system must be solved simultaneously (Gujarati & Porter, 2009). The result  of
endogeneity is that a regressor is correlated with the error-term and therefore OLS will lead to
biased and inconsistent estimates. If there is no endogeneity, it is more efficient to use OLS.
In endogeneity case, since OLS is biased and inconsistent, 2SLS is the best. The method of
instrumental  variables  (IV)  uses  2SLS.  Instruments  are  new exogenous  variables  and  not
correlated with the error. In our model whether the SALES, INSOWN and FFLOAT variables are
endogenous were determined by Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test. This test is formed by including
the  residuals  of  each  endogenous  variable  as  a  function  of  all  exogenous  variables  in  a
regression of the original model. Endogeneity is tested by using a t-test of the residuals in the
regression  model.  Rejecting  the  null  hypotheses  indicates  that  the  effects  of  endogenous
regressors on the estimates are meaningful and instrumental variables methods are necessary.
In the first model, since there is a suspicion that SALES and FFLOAT are endogenous variables,
we choose owners’  equity as potential  instrumental  variable  for  SALES and net profit  and
owners’  equity for  FFLOAT.  Owners’  equity  doesn’t  seem to affect  DSCORE but  is  a  good
predictor for SALES. Similarly net profit and owners’ equity are not expected to affect directly
DSCORE but affecting FFLOAT. In the second model potential endogenous variables are SALES
and INSOWN. Instrumental variables for INSOWN are net profit and owners’ equity like FFLOAT
due to the high correlation and complementary situation between FFLOAT and INSOWN. A
similar high correlation exists between SALES and ASSETS, therefore instrumental variable for
SALES  can  also  be  used  for  ASSETS  in  the  third  and  fourth  models.  When  we  test  the
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statistical significance of the coefficients on the residuals in the structural equations for each
model separately by the Hausman Test, we find that SALES is the only endogenous variable at
10% level of significance.  Other suspected variables in all  the models are exogenous. The
significance levels of the residuals for the models are as follows,
Model  1:  SALES  (P=0.056),  FFLOAT  (P=0.984);  Model  2:  SALES  (P=0.07),  INSOWN
(P=0.632); Model 3: ASSETS (P=0.531), FFLOAT (P=0.279); Model 4: ASSETS (P=0.175),
INSOWN (P=0.230).
As a result 2SLS regression has been run for the first and second models and classical OLS was
used for the third and fourth models to find the effects of the variables on DSCORE.  
Analysis and results
Descriptive statistics
The sample consisting of 131 manufacturing firms is broken down into seven sectors based on
the BIST industry classification as shown in Table 1. 
Frequency Percent
Food, beverage 18 13.7
Wood, paper, printing 16 12.2
Chemical, petroleum, plastic 21 16.0
Basic metal 14 10.7
Metal products, machinery 22 16.8
Nonmetal mineral products 26 19.8
Textile, leather 14 10.7
Total 131 100.0
Table 1. Industrial Breakdown of Sample Firms
Table  2  indicates  descriptive  statistics  for  the  dependent  and  independent  variables.  The
average disclosure index score is 44%, with a wide range of 6% to 80%. Thus, there is a large
variety in voluntary disclosure practices among the sample corporations. While there are many
profitable firms, there are also unprofitable ones (30 firms). The average return on equity ratio
is 3%. The figures for firm size (i.e.  sales and assets) are provided as well  with average,
minimum and maximum values in terms of Turkish Liras (TL). The average of audit firm size
with 61% indicates that majority of the firms are clients of Big-4 auditing firms. The average
free float rate with a mean of 35.02% shows that the firms’ ownership is not diffused at all. On
the  contrary,  the  mean  of  institutional/corporate  ownership  with  55.79  indicates  that
substantial  portion  of  ownership  belongs  to  institutions  and  corporations.  44%  average
leverage ratio suggests that the firms are not highly leveraged. The board size ranges between
3  to  13  averaging  6.66  members.  On  average,  5%  of  board  members  are  independent
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directors. This result is quite below the average ratio provided in other studies such as Chen
and Jaggi (2000), Chau and Gray (2010), Ho and Wong (2001), respectively, 28.2%, 35%, and
34%. The sample firms’ average listing age is 17.67 years. The firms’ average listing age is not
very high, since the BIST was established at the end of 1985. Finally, the number of firms
listed in the Corporate Governance Index of the BIST is 16, and therefore, the average of this
variable is 12%.
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
Disclosure score 
index 0.06 0.80 0.44 0.16
Sales (Turkish Liras) 4,090,310.00 26,165,954,000.00 1,015,119,239.79 2,937,426,045.47
Assets (Turkish 
Liras) 8,260,970.00 13,918,037,000.00 922,432,224.47 2,015,074,014.31
Return on equity -0.76 0.56 0.03 0.23
Leverage 0.02 1.04 0.44 0.22
Auditor size 0.00 1.00 0.61 0.49
Free float rate 0.49 95.07 35.02 20.41
Institutional/corpora
te ownership 0.00 99.28 55.79 27.16
Board Size 3.00 13.00 6.66 2.03
Independent 
directors 0.00 0.60 0.05 0.11
Listing age 1.00 27.00 17.67 6.09
Listing in Corporate 
Governance Index of 
BIST
0.00 1.00 0.12 0.33
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for All Variables (N=131, year 2010)
Table 3 presents means of the sub-disclosure indices. Based on the means, we can compare
means  of  indices  and  say  that  general  information  items  (mean=68.9%),  financial
performance items (mean=62.2%), key non-financial information items (mean=58.7%), and
corporate governance items (mean=55.6%) are  the most  disclosed items among the sub-
categories  of  disclosure  items.  The  lowest  disclosure  index  is  found  for  forward-looking
information  (mean=17.8%).  Means  of  other  sub-categories  vary  between  30% and  40%.
Hence, there is room for Turkish firms to improve themselves in relation to, at least, certain
aspects of voluntary disclosure.
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Mean Std. Deviation
General information index 0.689 0.217
Corporate strategy index 0.342 0.246
Corporate governance index 0.556 0.255
Financial performance index 0.622 0.213
Key non-financial information index 0.587 0.225
Forward-looking information index 0.178 0.207
Employee disclosure index 0.320 0.164
Social responsibility index 0.394 0.347
Environmental disclosure index 0.373 0.288
Segment reporting index 0.347 0.290
Risk management index 0.300 0.220
Customer and supplier disclosure 
index
0.310 0.180
Table 3. Means of Sub-Disclosure Indices
Univariate analysis
Before  proceeding  to  multivariate  tests  we  should  investigate  the  correlation  among  the
explanatory  independent  variables  and  check  the  existence  of  multicollinearity.  For  this
purpose, the Pearson Correlation analysis was conducted. Table 4 reports the results of this
analysis. According to the results, the disclosure index has significant positive correlation with
sales,  assets,  return  on equity,  auditor  size,  institutional/corporate  ownership,  board  size,
proportion of independent directors on the boards, listing in the Corporate Governance Index
of the BIST. It has significant negative correlation with only ownership diffusion. This implies
that the more ownership is diffused, the less information firms are likely to disclose.
Furthermore, high correlation coefficients between sales and assets, and institutional/corporate
ownership and free float rate attract the attention. Although 0.80 (Bryman & Cramer, 2001) or
0.90 (Hair, Black, Babin & Anderson, 2009) is considered as a threshold for multicollinearity
problem,  we  decided  to  be  a  bit  more  conservative  and  to  accept  the  existence  of
multicollinearity between institutional/corporate ownership and free float rate with correlation
coefficient approaching 0.80.
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DSCORE SALES ASSETS ROE LEVER AUDITOR
DSCORE 1
SALES **0.427 1
ASSETS **0.466 **0.859 1
ROE *0.174 0.143 *0.185 1
LEVER -0.079 0.167 0.107 **-0.470 1
AUDITOR **0.345 *0.187 **0.231 0.078 -0.044 1
FFLOAT *-0.201 -0.076 -0.048 -0.131 -0.059 **-0.287
INSOWN **0.285 0.139 0.138 *0.192 -0.086 **0.357
BSIZE **0.326 **0.295 **0.328 **0.265 -0.166 **0.247
INDIR *0.203 0.028 0.038 0.037 -0.009 -0.071
LAGE 0.090 0.024 0.041 0.079 -0.024 0.171
XCORP **0.435 **0.370 **0.399 0.153 0.048 *0.202
FFLOAT INSOWN BSIZE INDIR LAGE
DSCORE
SALES
ASSETS
ROE
LEVER
AUDITOR
FFLOAT 1
INSOWN **-0.763 1
BSIZE -0.164 *0.218 1
INDIR 0.079 0.018 0.124 1
LAGE *-0.178 *0.190 0.026 **-
0.251
1
XCORP 0.006 0.105 **0.281 0.147 -0.118
DSCORE Disclosure score index
SALES Total sales revenue
ASSETS Total assets
ROE Return on stockholders’ equity
LEVER Leverage as measured by total liabilities divided by total assets
AUDITOR Audit firm size
FFLOAT Free float rate
INSOWN Institutional/corporate ownership
BSIZE Board size
INDIR Independent directors
LAGE Listing age
XCORP Listing in Corporate Governance Index of the BIST
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); * Correlation is significant
at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
Table 4. Pearson Correlation Analysis
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Multivariate analysis
We performed Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) regressions
to examine the association between the explanatory variables and voluntary disclosure level.
The results of the regressions are presented in Table 5 for four models.
Independent 
variables a
Expected
sign
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
(2SLS) (2SLS) (OLS) (OLS)
Intercept ? -0.467 ***-0.866 *-0.604 ***-1.028
(-1.39) (-2.95) (-1.92) (-3.77)
ASSETS + ***1.06E-10 ***1.02E-10
(3.67) (3.51)
SALES + ***1.14E-10 ***1.10E-10
(3.57) (3.43)
ROE + -0.206 (-0.166 -0.128 -0.092
(-0.73) -0.60) (-0.48) (-0.35)
LEVER + **-0.642 *(-0.548 *-0.450 -0.358
(-2.21) (-1.92) (-1.70) (-1.36)
AUDITOR + **0.231 **0.236 **0.232 **0.233
(1.99) (2.00) (2.05) (2.03)
FFLOAT + *-0.005 **-0.005
(-1.86) (-2.03)
INSOWN + 0.003 *0.003
(1.47) (1.69)
BSIZE + 0.009 0.012 0.020 0.023
(0.29) (0.40) (0.71) (0.810)
INDIR + ***1.286 **1.205 ***1.233 **1.146
(2.69) (2.51) (2.66) (2.46)
LAGE + 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.012
(1.44) (1.41) (1.46) (1.41)
XCORP + **0.456 **0.432 ***0.542 ***0.513
(2.45) (2.32) (3.13) (2.96)
F-value 4.780 4.620 9.180 8.950
Adjusted R2 0.323 0.322 0.362 0.355
Significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
a Independent variables are explained in model development section and Table 4. 
b t-values are presented in parentheses.
* Significant at 10% level.
** Significant at 5% level.
*** Significant at 1% level.
Table 5. OLS and 2SLS Regression Results
In models 2 and 4, the effect of institutional/corporate ownership on voluntary information
disclosure level was tested. As seen from the results, there is a significant association between
INSOWN and DSCORE in Model 4 at the 10% level, but not in Model 2. Thus, Hypothesis 1 is
accepted. This finding is contradictory to the findings of Haniffa and Cooke (2002) and Eng and
Mak (2003) but it  supports El-Gazzar (1998) who argued that institutional ownership may
induce a higher voluntary disclosure level. This finding may suggest that institutional/corporate
ownership contributes to better development of corporate disclosure culture, and improves
transparency leading to less information asymmetry and reduced agency costs.
The second hypothesis suggests a positive association between a firm’s ownership diffusion
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and the level of voluntary disclosure. Models 1 and 3 test the presence of this association
between  FFLOAT and  DSCORE.  We found  an  unanticipated significant  negative  association
between the two variables at the 10% level in model 1 and 5% level in model 3, thus rejecting
Hypothesis  2.  Hence,  we  can  say  that  the  more  diffused  ownership  a  firm has,  the less
voluntary information it discloses. The rejection of this hypothesis might be due to the fact that
when ownership is too much diffused, the firm's shareholders are generally too diversified to
take  much  direct  interest  in  a  particular  firm  (Fama,  1980).  Thus,  there  is  no  strong
mechanism  to  monitor  what  information  firm  discloses;  in  other  words  no  one  cares
information disclosure. It is also probable that the management of firms which have diffused
ownership structure tend to disclose less information not to harm the competitive position of
the firm in the market.
In the third hypothesis, we suggest that there is a positive association between INDIR and
DSCORE. The results provide empirical evidence for such association in models 2 and 4 at the
5% level, and in models 1 and 3 at the 1% level. This implies that the higher the proportion of
independent directors on the board, the more the firm discloses voluntary information. Hence,
Hypothesis  3 is  accepted.  This result  confirms Cheng and Courtenay (2006), Huafang and
Jianguo (2007), Patelli and Prencipe (2007), and Chau and Gray (2010) but contradicts Forker
(1992), Ho and Wong (2001), Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Eng and Mak (2003), Gul and Leung
(2004) and Hossain and Reaz (2007). This finding provides support to the argument that the
inclusion of independent directors on board is actually effective in reducing agency problems, is
perceived as a potential solution to many of the corporate governance problems, and serves as
a check on management on behalf of external shareholders (Patelli & Prencipe, 2007).
We next tested whether board size affects the voluntary disclosure level of firms. No significant
association was found between BSIZE and DSCORE. Hence,  Hypothesis 4 is  rejected.  This
could be explained by the fact that board size may not mean board quality if  it  does not
operate  efficiently.  While  the  board's  monitoring  capacity  increases  as  more  directors  are
added  to  the  board,  the  benefit  may  be  outweighed  by  the  incremental  cost  of  poorer
communication and decision-making associated with larger groups (John & Senbet,  1998).
Thus, the efficiency of board’s working is important rather than its size.  
Listing in the XCORP of the BIST was assumed to have positive relationship with the disclosure
level. The hypothesis testing provided evidence that there is a significant positive association
between listing the XCORP and DSCORE at the 5% level in models 1 and 2, at the 1% level in
models 3 and 4. Therefore, it can be said that listing in the XCORP improves the disclosure
level of voluntary information. Hence, Hypothesis 5 is accepted. A similar result was found by
Uyar (2012). This finding is not surprising due to the fact that firms included in the XCORP are
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the ones that have high rating in implementing corporate governance principles, one dimension
of which is public disclosure and transparency.
Listing  age  was  also  expected  to  have  positive  impact  on  the  disclosure  level.  However,
hypothesis  testing  yielded  no  significant  result  in  all  models.  We  can  say  that  voluntary
information disclosure level is independent of listing age in the BIST. Thus, Hypothesis 6 is
rejected. Likewise, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) reached the same conclusion. They explain this
situation saying that “newly listed companies need to disclose more information to reduce
scepticism and boost confidence of investors who may perceive them as more risky” (Haniffa &
Cooke, 2002: page 330).
We tested whether firm size has an impact on the extent of voluntary disclosure level. The
variables  of  SALES in  models  1  and  2  and  ASSETS  in  models  3  and  4  are  positive  and
significant at  1% level which suggests that firm size affects  the voluntary disclosure level
positively. The findings lend support to Hypothesis 7 regarding firm size. Hence, there is a
significant positive association between firm size and voluntary disclosure level. Our finding
confirms many previous studies (Wallace et al., 1994; Inchausti, 1997; Eng & Mak, 2003; Aksu
& Kosedag, 2006; Alsaeed, 2006; Hossain & Reaz, 2007; Huafang & Jianguo, 2007; Hossain &
Hammami, 2009; Uyar, 2009; Chau & Gray, 2010). The impact of firm size on disclosure level
could  be explained by  the fact  that  larger  firms have better  organization  structure,  more
developed information system, more complex operating activities and segments,  and more
diversified. All these factors might be the reasons of why large firms stay ahead of small firms
in terms of voluntary disclosure.
As seen from the results, profitability (i.e. ROE) has no significant association with DSCORE in
all models. This implies that the profitability does not explain the variation of disclosure level
among Turkish companies. Hence, Hypothesis  8 in relation to profitability  is  rejected. This
finding is inconsistent with Haniffa and Cooke, (2002), Gul and Leung (2004) and Cheng and
Courtenay  (2006)  who  found  positive  significant  association,  but  confirms  Ho  and  Wong
(2001),  Alsaeed  (2006),  Hossain  and  Hammami  (2009),  Wallace  et  al.  (1994),  Inchausti
(1997) and Chau and Gray (2010) who found no significant association. The rejection of this
hypothesis might be explained by the proprietary cost hypothesis, according to which firms’
decisions to disclose information is affected by concern that such disclosures can damage their
competitive position in product markets (Healy & Palepu, 2001).
In models 1, 2 and 3, it can be observed that LEVER has significant negative association with
the extent of  voluntary disclosure level  at  10% level.  The significant negative relationship
between  LEVER  and  DSCORE  shows  that  the  leveraged  firms  disclose  less  voluntary
information contrary to our expectation. In model 4, no significant relationship exists between
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LEVER and DSCORE. Hence, the results of all  models reject Hypothesis 9 which presumed
significant positive association between the two variables. This result is consistent with the
result  of  Eng  and  Mak  (2003)  which  also  found  negative  significant  association,  but
inconsistent with many earlier studies (Malone et al., 1993; Hossain et al.,  1995; Wallace et
al., 1994; Inchausti, 1997; Ho & Wong, 2001; Aksu & Kosedag, 2006; Alsaeed, 2006; Huafang
&  Jianguo,  2007;  Chau  &  Gray,  2010)  which  either  found  a  positive  or  no  significant
association. Negative association between information disclosure level and leverage might be
attributable to the rationale of  signalling theory that lower-geared companies may wish to
draw attention to their financial structure by disclosing more voluntary information (Akerlof,
1970).  They  might  make  more  presentation  regarding  their  risk  management  policy  by
disclosing related items particularly. Alternatively, the negative association between the two
variables might be explained by the fact that when debt level of a firm is high, it tends to
disclose less information not to damage their competitive position in the market.
According to the results of all models, significant positive association exists between AUDITOR
and DSCORE at 5% level. The clients of Big-4 auditing companies are more likely to disclose
more voluntary information. Thus, Hypothesis 10 stating a positive association between auditor
size and the level of voluntary disclosure is  accepted. Although the result  agrees with the
findings of Singhvi and Desai (1971),  Inchausti (1997), Patton and Zelenka (1997) and Uyar
(2011), it disagrees with the results of Wallace et al. (1994), Alsaeed (2006), Huafang and
Jianguo (2007) and Chau  and Gray (2010). This finding, which is in line with expectations,
might signal that large auditing firms do not only audit financial statements of their clients, but
also guide them towards better corporate reporting and higher corporate transparency.
Depending on the results obtained from all models, we can conclude that there is not much
variety among the four models. The results of all models indicate that the F-ratio is between
4.620 (p=0.000) and 9.180 (p=0.000). These results statistically support the significance of all
models.  Adjusted-R2  values,  between  0.322  and  0.362  for  all  models,  imply  that  the
independent  variables  explain  between  32.2%  and  36.2%  of  the  variance  in  voluntary
disclosure  index  and  this  result  compares  favourably  with  similar studies  of  Huafang  and
Jianguo (2007) at 7.9 %, Chen and Jaggi (2000) at 30%, Gul and Leung (2004) at 19%,
Hossain and Reaz (2007) at 25.6% and Ho and Wong (2001) at 31.4%.
Conclusions
The  objective  of  this  study  was  to  determine  which  factors  impact  voluntary  information
disclosure  level  of  Turkish  listed  manufacturing  companies  for  the  year  2010.  We  extend
previous research on the determinants of voluntary information disclosure in some aspects.
First, unlike many earlier studies conducted in developed countries, this study examines the
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voluntary  information  disclosure  practices  of  companies  in  Turkey  which  is  an  important
developing country. Secondly, this study utilized a comprehensive set of variables and tested
ten hypotheses to provide evidence regarding disclosure practices of companies.  Thus, the
study  provides  empirical  evidence  in  relation  to  the  effects  of  these  variables  on  the
information disclosure level.
The present study has demonstrated that Turkish firms’ disclosure level is at moderate level.
Although the regulations of the CMB, particularly regarding corporate governance principles,
contributed to the improvement of voluntary disclosure practices of the firms, there is a need
to improve disclosure standard to higher levels. Therefore, there is still a considerable way to
go, particularly in some aspects of disclosure practices such as forward-looking information,
social responsibility, human resources, risk management-related disclosure, and environmental
disclosure. 
The  findings  of  the  study  provide  evidence  of  a  positive  association  between  voluntary
information disclosure level and the variables such as firm size, auditing firm size, proportion
of independent directors  on the board,  institutional/corporate ownership,  and listing in the
Corporate Governance Index of the BIST.  However,  leverage and ownership diffusion were
found to have negative significant association with the extent of  voluntary disclosure. The
remaining  variables,  namely,  profitability,  listing  age,  and  board  size  were  found  to  have
insignificant effect.
Furthermore, the study has some implications for firms, auditors, investors, and regulators. All
these parties play an important role in improving the transparency and disclosure practices of
corporations.  Firms  may  increase  voluntary  information  disclosure  by  being  aware  of
advantages  of  information  disclosure.  Investors  may  demand  higher  disclosure  from
management.  Regulatory  bodies,  such  as  the  Capital  Markets  Board,  may  guide  firms by
issuing guidelines for proper voluntary disclosure practices in annual reports. Finally, auditing
firms  may  also  make  contributions  in  improving  firms’  corporate  culture  about  disclosure
practices.
The study has got some implications for emerging markets such as Turkey particularly. These
markets have high growth rate and are expected to sustain their growth in the coming years.
To finance growth, they need external capital. In this respect, attracting international capital
flow to these markets is very important. On the other hand emerging markets have some
deficiencies  such  as  concentrated  ownership,  high  information  asymmetry,  greater  agency
costs  which  hinder  free  flow  of  capital.  Consequently,  voluntary  disclosure  contributes  to
alleviate these problems, makes the firms more transparent and accountable, and open the
way for capital flow. Therefore, the subject is quite important for emerging markets. However,
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it should be kept in mind that firms cannot carry out this transformation without support of
regulatory bodies as mentioned above.
The findings have some theoretical implications as well.  Theoretical bases discussed in the
literature review and hypothesis development sections are partially validated. We found that
some variables  play  significant  role  on  the  level  of  voluntary  disclosure  as  hypothesized,
however some variables do not, contrary to expectations (i.e. profitability,  listing age, and
board size). Furthermore, two variables’ (i.e. leverage and ownership diffusion) signs were not
in the direction of hypothesized relationship. Thus, further studies are needed to provide more
empirical evidence.
Limitations and further research 
Since this study was conducted solely on listed manufacturing companies, the results should
be  interpreted  cautiously.  Findings  may  not  indicate  the  voluntary  information  disclosure
practices  of  unlisted  companies  and  other  industries  such  as  service  and  merchandising
industries. In the future, we aim to enlarge the sample by including those industries and renew
the study. Secondly, the study is a snapshot of only one point in time. Further longitudinal
studies covering several  periods could reveal more substantial  and interesting results,  and
trends. Over time, the quality of disclosure might improve (Kanto & Schadewitz, 1997). Gray,
Kouhy  and  Lavers  (1995)  and  Gao,  Heravi  and  Xiao  (2005)  conducted  such  longitudinal
research studies  and indicated that  information  disclosure  practices  do  change  over  time.
Thirdly, this study used the annual reports of firms as the information disclosure source, not
other sources such as web sites, press releases, and prospectuses. 
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Appendix A. Voluntary disclosure items
A General information
1 Brief history of the company
2 Ownership structure
3 Ethical rules
4 Values
5 Principal products
6 Principal markets
7 Main corporate events 
8 Official address/registered address/address for correspondence
9 Web address of the company/email address
10 English summary of the annual report or translation of the complete annual report
B Corporate strategy
11 Strategic information (Mission &Vision)
12 Statement of strategy and objectives-general
13 Statement of strategy and objectives-financial
14 Statement of strategy and objectives-marketing
15 Statement of strategy and objectives-social
C Corporate governance
16 Detail about the chairman
17 List of board members
18 Detail or bibliographies of the board members
19 List of senior managers/senior management structure
20 Background of senior managers
21 Comprehensive information on  independent directors 
22 Message of the Chairman
23 Picture of all directors/board of directors
24 Picture of chairperson only
D Financial Performance
25 Brief discussion and analysis of a financial position
26 R&D expenditures
27 Operating costs/Income
28 Comparative information with industry or competitors
29 Sales growth
30 Earnings growth
31 Profitability Ratios
32 Activity Ratios
33 Leverage Ratios
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34 Liquidity ratios
35 Share Price Information
36 Performance at a glance
E Key non-financial information
37 Percentage of sales in products in several years
38 Market share
39 Competitor analysis
40 Units sold
41 Production volume
42 Growth in units sold
43 Quality certificates 
44 Awards
45 Dividend policy
F Forward-looking information
46 Forecasted profits/profitability (quantitative & qualitative)
47 Market share forecasts (quantitative & qualitative)
48 Sales forecast (quantitative & qualitative)
49 Forecasted cash flows (quantitative & qualitative)
50 Capital expenditure forecast (quantitative & qualitative)
51 New investments (quantitative & qualitative)
52 Share price estimation (quantitative & qualitative)
G Employee disclosure
53 Age of employees
54 Number of employees
55 Gender of employees
56 Functional categorization of employees
57 Training and developing investments described 
58 Several activities about employees and their families
59 Employee compensation
60 Stock option schemes
61 Value-added per employee
62 Productivity indicator/Performance evaluation
63 Safety policy
64 Data on accidents
65 Cost of safety measures
66 Policy on communication
67 Equal opportunity policy statement
H Social responsibility
68 Sponsoring public health
69 Sponsoring sport activities
70 Sponsoring cultural recreations
71 Sponsoring education
72 Charitable donations
I Environmental disclosure
73 Environmental policy
74 Environment friendly products
75 Environmental indicators
76 Environmental awards and certificates
77 Environmental costs
78 Environmental education for employees and others
J Segment reporting
79 Segment reporting based on products
80 Geographical Segment reporting (sales, assets)
81 Geographical capital expenditure
82 Line-of-business production
K Risk management
83 General risk policy
84 Information on risk management committee
85 Information on risk management structure
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86 Information on credit risk management structure
87 Disclosure of credit rating system/process
88 General descriptions of market risk segments
89 Disclosure of interest rate risk
90 Disclosure of foreign currency risk
L Customer and supplier disclosure
91 Main customers, contractual relationships, prices, bargaining power
92 Geographic diversification and characteristic of retail network
93 Customer satisfaction, retention, loyalty
94 Customer profitability and reliance
95 Main suppliers, contractual relationship, and bargaining power
96 Supplier satisfaction, retention and commitment
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